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Abstract
We introduce and study a non-equilibrium continuous-time dynamical model of the
price of a single asset traded by a population of heterogeneous interacting agents in the
presence of uncertainty and regulatory constraints. The model takes into account (i)
the price formation delay between decision and investment by the second-order nature
of the dynamical equations, (ii) the linear and nonlinear mean-reversal or their con-
trarian in the form of speculative price trading, (iii) market friction, (iv) uncertainty
in the fundamental value which controls the amplitude of mispricing, (v) nonlinear
speculative momentum effects and (vi) market regulations that may limit large mis-
pricing drifts. We find markets with coexisting equilibrium, conventions and business
cycles, which depend on (a) the relative strength of value-investing versus momentum-
investing, (b) the level of uncertainty on the fundamental value and (c) the degree of
market regulation. The stochastic dynamics is characterized by nonlinear geometric
random walk-like processes with spontaneous regime shifts between different conven-
tions or business cycles. This model provides a natural dynamical framework to model
regime shifts between different market phases that may result from the interplay be-
tween the effects (i-vi).
2
1 Introduction
The concept of equilibrium has been central in economics for decades. However, it is gener-
ally understood that equilibrium is just the first approximation to the real market, valid on
average and for long time scales under certain idealized conditions. While equilibrium models
have been quite useful in economics, real markets exhibit signatures of non-equilibrium, best
exemplified during speculative bubbles (White, 1996) by the many documented instances of
herding behavior (Shefrin, 2000). This non-equilibrium may lead to divergence from fun-
damental value, anomalously large volatility (Shiller, 1989) and sometimes unstable abrupt
price variations in rallies and crashes (Sornette, 2003). The behavior of the market is said
to be nonlinear as the price set can be different depending for instance on the number of
interacting agents. The non-equilibrium nature of markets is especially pronounced in the
sharp price variations occurring at booms and crashes, which are also accompanied by wild
price fluctuations (Sornette, 1998; Sornette and Johansen, 2001; Sornette, 2003; Broekstra
et al., 2005). These regimes require the use of non-equilibrium dynamical models (Farmer,
2002).
Here, we propose and study a non-equilibrium continuous-time dynamical model of the
price of a single asset traded by a population of heterogeneous interacting agents in the
presence of uncertainty and regulatory constraints. The model is defined by the equations
(13, 14) derived below, based on symmetry and structural constraints. Such a constructive
scheme has a long tradition in the mathematical theory of dynamical systems and in the
statistical physics of complex assemblies of elements (atoms, molecules, spins, and so on).
This tradition is based on both the successes of this approach and on the many verifica-
tions that the structure of the obtained equations can be justified and derived from a full
calculation involving all possible interactions between the microscopic elements, when this
is feasible (Wilson, 1979). Such a tradition is non-existent in economic theory but we think
it is inspiring to attempt to use and adapt in the goal of obtaining new insights. Here, we
acknowledge the huge difficulty in first describing correctly the decision making process of
individual investors, and second in developing a first-principled approach of the aggregate
behavior. The symmetry- and structural-based constructive method that we propose by-
passes these difficulties by guiding us towards what should be the generic structure of the
macroscopic processes that survive and capture the transition from the microscopic worlds
of many interacting agents to the macroscopic collective market.
The model, that we obtain, has two specific characteristics. First, in contrast with most
models, it is second-order in its time derivative to account for the temporal delays between
agents’ actions and the formation of price. Second, it emphasizes the importance of taking
into account strong nonlinear behaviors in a ”non-perturbative” way in order not to rule
out possible large deviations from equilibrium and to describe them correctly. For this, we
suggest a novel way of treating nonlinear terms, which yields nonpolynomial nonlinearities.
The form of the latter automatically stabilizes the market dynamics, without the necessity of
introducing artificial constraints. A main goal of the model is to understand the conditions
under which different price regimes may result from the competition between mean-reversal
to equilibrium and herding. This competition is controlled by (i) the degree of uncertainty
in the fundamental value of the asset and (ii) how market regulations may constrain large
price variations.
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The work most closely resembling ours is the adaptation to financial markets by Broekstra
et al. (2005) of Weidlich’s (2000) extended model of opinion formation and political phase
transitions. This model is also formulated as a nonlinear system of two ordinary differential
equations of two dynamical variables, hence it supports cycles as does our model with second-
order dynamics. The two interacting variables are the global unbalance between supply and
demand for a share and the personal preference or sentiment of agents. As our model,
Weidlich’s (2000) model exhibits fixed points, cycles and exponentially growing unstable
regimes. Based on a micro-foundation of transition rates depending exponentially on the
number of investors in buy or sell positions, it however lacks the ”convention” fixed points
that we unravel and the nonlinear blow-up regimes, which have been found to characterize
well explosive bubbles and crashes (Sornette, 2003).
Our main results are the derivation of a new nonlinear and nonequilibrium model of finan-
cial markets, a detailed investigation of its dynamics, classification of all possible dynamical
phase portraits corresponding to qualitatively different types of markets, and the study of
the role of stochasticity, which is shown to be a triggering mechanism for the transition of
the price trajectories between different dynamic regimes.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We present in section 2 the derivation of
the dynamical equations for the asset price dynamics. Section 3 gives the classification of
the limiting and degenerate cases of the dynamics, which serve as pivots to understand all
the different regimes. Section 4 derives the full classification of the different market regimes.
This dynamics turns out to be unusually rich, demonstrating several nontrivial bifurcations
leading to coexisting prices (equilibrium on the fundamental value and ”conventions”) as
well as cycles. The main dynamical regimes of the market evolution are illustrated by the
related phase portraits and by direct representations of the time dynamics of the price. The
different regimes depend on (a) the relative strength of value-investing versus momentum-
investing, (b) the level of uncertainty on the fundamental value and (c) the degree of market
regulation.
2 Derivation of Price Dynamics
2.1 General structure
Market dynamics is usually described by the time dependence of an asset price p(t) or the
log-price log p(t), where the logarithm is understood as the natural logarithm. After Bache-
lier (1900), one has standardly considered first-order stochastic differential equations. But
Farmer (2002) emphasized that, for the correct description of nonequilibrium markets, one
has to deal with second-order dynamical equations, which take into account temporal delays
between agent actions and the formation of price. In this spirit, second-order differential
equations for the log-price were considered by Bouchaud and Cont (1998) and by Grassia
(2000).
Consider an asset with market price p(t) at time t. The anticipated future discount
factors and expected flow of dividends provide in principle the fundamental value pf(t) of
the asset. But, pf(t) is not directly observable, so that we define the mispricing variable as the
difference between the logarithm of the market price and the logarithm of the fundamental
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price (Ide and Sornette, 2002)
x ≡ log p− log pf . (1)
We assume that x follows the following process
dx = ydt+ σdW . (2)
In equilibrium markets, the drift term y in (2) is determined (He and Leland, 1993) from the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the agents (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
2004). For non-equilibrium markets, we consider that the drift y is determined as a function
of state variables. In the equilibrium-based models of Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990,
1993) and Bonomo and Garcia (1994a, b, 1996) for instance, the state variable governs the
evolution of the fundamentals of consumption and dividends of the economy. Here, we add
the new ingredient that these fundamentals of the economy are not exogeneous. We account
for the possibility that the state variables are themselves depending endogeneously on the
mispricing x and drift term y. This structure implies a feedback mechanism capturing the
reflexivity and self-consistency of financial market resulting from the collective organization
of investors. This represents what G. Soros refers to as “reflexivity”, that is, “actors observing
their own deeds,” such that “market participants are trying to discount a future that is itself
shaped by market expectations.” Mathematically, we thus postulate the following process
for the drift term
dy = f(x, y, t)dt+ σ′dW ′ , (3)
W and W ′ are two standard (possibly correlated) Wiener processes. The right-hand side of
(3) represents the overall contributions of all market “forces,” that may influence the market
price to drift away from the fundamental price. Generally, this “force” depends on time and
may also contain random terms. Note that (2) together with (3) makes the dynamics of the
mispricing effectively of second-order. This accounts for the delay between the decision and
impact of agents on the price forming process.
The structure of f(x, y, t) in (3) should give the possibility to describe strongly nonequi-
librium markets, with large price variations, such as occurring during financial bubbles and
crashes. In this spirit, several nonlinear equations have been studied aiming at characteriz-
ing the first-order dynamics of price during financial bubbles (Sornette and Andersen, 2002;
Andersen and Sornette, 2004) and the second-order dynamics of price or log-price during
stock market booms and crashes (Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; Pandey and Stauffer, 2000; Ide
and Sornette, 2002). A system of equations for price, which can be reduced to a third-order
differential equation has also been suggested (Thurner, 20001).
2.2 Symmetry, Taylor expansion and resummation method
Equations (2) and (3) describe the general market evolution. To specify the market ”force”,
let us consider the case, when there are no external influences in addition to those impacting
directly the fundamental value pf(t), so that the force is defined by the market structure itself,
and f(x, y) can be considered independent of time. As usual, we assume that the driving
market force f(x, y) is an analytic function of its arguments, hence, it can be represented as
a Taylor expansion
f(x, y) =
∑
m,n
cmnx
myn . (4)
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Our aim is to model the market force in such a form that it would be, on the one
hand, sufficiently simple and, on the other hand, catching the basic properties of the market
structure as well as the agent’s collective characteristics and style. To this end, we notice
that the influence of the cross-terms xmyn on the dynamics are analogous to the sum of
terms xm+n and ym+n. Therefore, it is possible to neglect the cross-terms, accordingly
renormalizing the coefficients of the terms xm and yn. This is equivalent to saying that the
force is additive,
f(x, y) = f1(x) + f2(y) (5)
being the sum of the terms
f1(x) =
∞∑
n=0
anx
n , f2(y) =
∞∑
n=0
bny
n . (6)
Another simplification that one often uses is the assumption that the market is symmetric,
in the sense that there is no drastic difference between rising and falling prices (Farmer, 2002).
Of course, this is not exactly true for real markets, but can be accepted as a reasonable
approximation. Here, we assume a weaker symmetry, that is, the dynamics is the same for
upward as for downward mispricing x. This does not prevent the observable asset price p(t)
to present asymmetric structures, which can then be traced to the asymmetric behavior of
the fundamental price pf (t). For instance, the so-called leverage effect is not excluded in our
model. Indeed, in its initial formulation (Black, 1976), it expresses an inverse relationship
between the level of equity prices and the instanteneous conditional volatility: a drop in
the price of the stock increases the debt-to-equity ratio and therefore the risk of the firm
which translates into a higher volatility of the stock. This mechanism acts at the level of
the fundamental price pf(t) and can thus be straightforwardly incorporated in a suitable
dynamics of pf , whose specification is not needed here in our first effort emphasizing the
different classes of mispricing dynamics. More complex forms of leverage effects which could
appear on mispricing (Figlewski and Wang, 2000) are excluded in our model.
Within our formulation, the symmetry of the mispricing implies that the evolution equa-
tions (2) and (3) should be invariant under the inversion transformation
x → −x y → −y W → −W . (7)
This requires that the market force be asymmetric, such that
f(−x,−y) = −f(x, y) . (8)
Thence, in the Taylor expansions for f1(x) and f2(y), only the odd terms remain, while there
are no even terms, since a2n = b2n = 0.
Separating the linear and nonlinear terms in the force, we may write
f1(x) = a1x+ a3x
3ϕ1(x) , f2(y) = b1y + b3y
3ϕ2(y) , (9)
where
ϕ1(x) ≡ 1 + a5
a3
x2 +
a7
a3
x4 + . . . ,
ϕ2(y) ≡ 1 + b5
b3
y2 +
b7
b3
y4 + . . . .
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Nonlinearities are commonly introduced into the market dynamics by assuming that the
effective force driving the market can be expanded in Taylor series and by limiting these series
by several first terms (Farmer, 2002). The general weak point of nonlinear equations with
polynomial nonlinearities is the appearance of unstable solutions, when either the market
price, or the price rate, or both become divergent, often even at a finite moment of time (Ide
and Sornette, 2002). Actual divergences in markets are, of course, unrealistic. Therefore, as
soon as there arise singular solutions, this means that the corresponding market is absolutely
unstable and cannot exist. Alternatively, one could impose additional constraints regular-
izing the admissible price variations (Grassia, 2000; Farmer, 2002). However, externally
imposed constraints practically kill the influence of nonlinear terms and make the market
dynamics rather poor, not allowing for large price fluctuations typical around booms and
crashes. The latter phenomena are principally collective and strongly nonlinear, somewhat
similar to phase transitions and critical phenomena, where the characteristic nonlinearities
are to be appropriately treated (Yukalov and Shumovsky, 1990; Sornette, 2006).
Another issue with the standard way of dropping higher-order terms, leading to ϕ1(x) = 1
and ϕ2(x) = 1, is that this would assume that there are no large or fast price variations, so
that the market is close to equilibrium and therefore the values x and y can be treated as
small. But as we wish not to rule out the possibility of describing strongly out-of-equilibrium
markets, where the mispricing can be large and its change fast, it would be principally
incorrect to omit the higher-order terms in the force. We conclude that all terms in ϕ1(x)
and ϕ2(y) must be kept for correctly describing non-equilibrium markets.
However, keeping an infinite number of nonlinear terms would make the problem un-
treatable. At the same time, limiting the divergent series by a finite number of terms is
principally wrong as we said earlier. The way out of this conundrum is to find an effective
way to perform the sum in the infinite series by means of a resummation procedure. For
this purpose, it is convenient to employ the self-similar approximation theory previously
developed in (Yukalov, 1990, 1991, 1992; Yukalov and Yukalova, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002;
Gluzman and Yukalov, 1997). The variant of this theory, involving the self-similar exponen-
tial approximants (Yukalov and Gluzman, 1997, 1998) is the most appropriate for describing
market processes (Gluzman and Yukalov, 1998; Andersen et al., 2000; Yukalov, 2000, 2001).
By means of the self-similar exponential approximants, the series for ϕ1(x) and ϕ2(y) can
be transformed into
ϕ1(x) = exp
(
a5
a3
x2 exp
(
a7
a5
x2 . . .
))
, (10)
ϕ2(y) = exp
(
b5
b3
y2 exp
(
b7
b5
y2 . . .
))
. (11)
For what follows, in order not to overcomplicate the problem, it is sufficient to use the
first-order exponential approximants
ϕ1(x) = exp
(
− x
2
µ2
)
, ϕ2(y) = exp
(
− y
2
λ2
)
, (12)
in which
µ2 ≡ − a3
a5
, λ2 ≡ − b3
b5
,
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where the coefficients a3 and a5 (respectively b3 and b5) have opposite signs.
In this way, starting from equation (2), we obtain the following system of equations
(13,14) describing the evolution of non-equilibrium market mispricing
dx = ydt+ σdW , (13)
Equation (3) for the drift takes the form
dy
dt
= αx+ βy + Ax3 exp
(
− x
2
µ2
)
+By3 exp
(
− y
2
λ2
)
, (14)
in which, for convenience, we use the notation
α ≡ a1 , β ≡ b1 , A ≡ a3 , B ≡ b3 .
In expression (14), we have taken σ′ equal to zero to emphasize the deterministic feedback
processes controlling the dynamics of the drift of the mispricing.
The equations (13,14) constitute our basis for describing at a coarse-grained level the
price dynamics resulting from the aggregate action of investors. The equations (13) and
(14) have been introduced phenomenologically by using only very general symmetry and
structural considerations, following the strategy of model constructions developed in the
mathematics of dynamical systems described by ordinary differential equations (Arnold,
1978). The strength of our derivation lies in capturing the main ingredients of the collective
aggregate behavior of the asset price. The use of symmetry and structural reasoning allows
one to bypass the need for the exceedingly difficult description of the dynamical decision
making processes and interactions between heterogeneous agents. In this way, the theory is
less prone to mispecification error, in the sense that that the global collective description
can be thought of as more robust than a micro-foundation which is very susceptible to
model errors. The weakness of our approach is that we do not use a microeconomic agent-
based model where consumption preferences or utility functions appear explicitly. However,
this is not necessarily a handicap as the aggregate decision making processes lead to a
dynamical evolution equation, and it is the later that we attempt to capture in a robust way.
The parameters of the theory are not determined quantitatively by some assumptions of
agent preferences, but should be considered as general effective collective parameters whose
meaning is elaborated below.
The equations (13,14) provide us the opportunity to study what are the conditions for
market efficiency, when and how does the price converge to equilibrium when starting from
non-equilibrium initial conditions, what are other possible regimes which may result from
the interplay between uncertainty, herding and market regulations?
2.3 Economic and behavioral interpretation
Before presenting a detailed study of equations (13) and (14), it is useful to extract the
economic meaning of the parameters α, β, A, µ, B, λ appearing in equation (14). First, the
dynamics of the mispricing variable x = log(p/pf) is clearly of second-order in the time
derivative, in agreement with Farmer’s (2002) arguments. The form of the equations shows
that this is a non-Hamiltonian system, with the implication that there is no conserved
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quantity such as a probability or energy, as can be expected for a driven out-of-equilibrium
system. The terms in the right-hand side of (14) express the different contributions of the
market reactions due to deviations from equilibrium (x 6= 0 and y 6= 0), that impact the
mispricing drift y.
• The term αx expresses a mean reversal if α < 0 resulting from value investment styles.
However, one should not exclude market phases in which α may be positive, reflecting
a speculative behavior in which over-valuation (resp. under-valuation) triggers more
demand (respectively less demand), pushing the price further up (resp. down) accord-
ing to a positive feedback effect. This behavior is typical in market phases which are
referred to as ”bubbles”.
• The parameter β of the second term of the r.h.s. of (14) is taken as always negative to
embody ”market friction”, i.e., the different costs and restraints, such as commissions
and tax implications associated with transactions. We consider that market friction
opposes the growth of the drift in mispricing, in order words, it tends to dampen large
price variations.
• The two nonlinear terms in (14) characterize the collective behavior of traders, result-
ing from their interactions. The first nonlinear term Ax3 exp(−x2/µ2) emphasizes or
corrects the effect of the first term αx for large mispricing. The first part Ax3 adds
on the linear term αx by stressing that a fraction of the population of investors may
decide to correct mispricing (A < 0) or speculate on further disequilibrium (A > 0),
only when the mispricing is sufficiently large. As argued in (Ide and Sornette, 2002),
this may be due to the fact that investors have only an approximate (and perhaps even
fuzzy) estimation of the fundamental value, since future dividends and discount rates
can be assessed only with rather large uncertainty. As a consequence, these investors
will only buy or sell when the mispricing is larger than their bracket of uncertainty.
This creates a threshold-like behavior which is adequately represented by a nonlinear
term such as Ax3. Ide and Sornette (2002) considered other powers xn with n > 1.
Here we stick to n = 3 for simplicity.
• The factor exp(−x2/µ2) plays a significant role only for nonlinear collective speculative
behavior characterized by A > 0. Without this term and for A > 0, the mispricing
equations (13) and (14) lead to finite-time singularities similar to those analyzed by Ide
and Sornette (2002), which cannot therefore describe a long-lived market, but only the
price run-up during a transient explosive bubble or the price collapse during a crash.
But in reality, the price cannot depart arbitrarily far away from the fundamental
value, i.e., the mispricing x cannot go to ±∞. If not the market forces, somehow
regulations or implementation market constraints come into play, such as so-called
circuit breakers. For instance, on October 27, 1997, circuit breakers caused the New
York Stock Exchange to halt trading for the first time in history as the Dow Jones
Industrial Average lost 554 points. Similarly, an upside mispricing cannot go on forever
if investors have some information on the real value pf . The saturation of the growth
potential of mispricing is embodied in the parameter µ, which can be thought of as a
measure of uncertainty in the fundamental value. If the uncertainty is small, µ is small,
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and the mispricing is limited due to the collective convergence of informed investors.
On the other hand, if the uncertainty is large, µ is large, and the mispricing can become
important. The limit µ → +∞ corresponds to the limit of absence of information on
the fundamental value pf .
• The last term in Eq. (14) contains two contributions. The nonlinear factor By3 takes
into account speculative trading behavior leading to a momentum effect, in which a
detected trend is reinforced. We thus only consider that case B > 0. Contrarian
strategies would lead to B < 0 but they are in general used by a minority of investors.
Hence, the collective behavior is better reflected by the majority style which we assume
to be B > 0. The nonlinearity stresses the fact that, as argued by Ide and Sornette
(2002), a trend is only detected when sufficiently strong. As a consequence, investors
take action based on momentum strategies only when y is sufficiently large, above
some noise background, thus leading to a kind of threshold effect well-captured by the
third-order nonlinearity. On the basis of similar arguments, Ide and Sornette (2002)
have also considered such a term ∼ ym with m > 1. Here, we stick to m = 3 for
simplicity.
• The last factor exp(−y2/λ2) embodies market regulation and λ can be called the ”liber-
atization” parameter. The larger it is, the more free are the changes of mispricing drift.
In contrast, when the liberalization parameter is small, i.e., regulations are significant,
large mispricing drifts are prevented by a rigid market.
To summarize the key points of the model of mispricing given by (13,14), we take into
account the price formation delay between decision and investment by the second-order na-
ture of the dynamical equations and we account for (i) linear and nonlinear mean-reversal or
their contrary in the form of speculative price trading, (ii) market friction, (iii) uncertainty in
the fundamental value which controls the amplitude of mispricing, (iv) nonlinear speculative
momentum effects and (v) market regulations that may act to limit large mispricing drifts.
2.4 Nonlinear dynamics versus stochasticity
The rest of the paper is devoted to a careful study of the system (13,14). In fact, there are
two elements to discuss. First, expression (14) contains highly nonlinear deterministic terms
which create, as we shall see, a rich phase diagram of different regimes. Second, the stochastic
term in (13), when injected in the dynamics, further enriches it. We can summarize the
situation by saying that there is an interplay between the nonlinear deterministic dynamics
with transient chaos and stochasticity. When omitting stochasticity, i.e., σdW to zero, we
obtain, as described below, many interesting regimes with coexisting attractors (equilibrium,
”conventions”, nonlinear cycles). Then, reinjecting a not-to-large stochasticity σdW makes
the dynamics follow the principal structures of the phase portrait obtained by neglecting it,
leading to some distortion of the deterministic trajectories, but not destroying the existing
attractors. Stochasticity mixes the basins of attraction of the different regimes and the basins
of attraction are replaced by transient traps. A trajectory can live for quite a long time inside
one of such trapping regions along a stochastic trajectory, but then jumps stochastically to
another trapping region, where it again can spend a rather long time. This gives a dynamical
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description of regime shifts which can provide an underpinning of Markov Chain switching
models (Hamilton, 1989; Hamilton and Raj, 2002). We shall illustrate this point at the
end of the paper, when our classification of the different regimes from which the price can
switch have been performed. Thus, our emphasis on the classification of the deterministic
trajectories of (13) and (14) obtained when σ = 0 does not mean that we consider the
market mispricing as deterministic. Rather, we emphasize the interplay between nonlinearity
and stochasticity, which may lead to possible explanations of some of the most important
stylized facts of financial time series, such as anomalous large volatility, long memory effect
in volatility, bubbles and crashes and regime shifts. But for a deeper understanding of
this interplay, it is necessary to first describe the structure of the deterministic attractions
(Horsthemke and Lefever, 1984).
3 Limiting and Degenerate Cases
In order to better understand the role of the different terms in the evolution equations
(13,14), let us consider some limiting cases, when these equations degenerate to simple or
known forms. In the study below, we assume that the noise term σdW can be neglected and
the market friction parameter is always negative, β < 0.
The summary of the analysis, presented below in the different subsections, is provided in
Table 1. For the convenience of notation, the ”convention” fixed points x∗2,3 are denoted as
x∗2,3 = ±s , s ≡
√
− α
A
, (15)
so that s corresponds to a positive mispricing convention and −s, to negative mispricing
convention. In the table, we show the conditions of the global or local stability and the
related stable fixed points. Local stability is associated with the existence of a finite basin
of attraction around the corresponding fixed point, that is, when this basin of attraction
does not cover the whole phase plane. The results are obtained by means of the Lyapunov
stability analysis as well as invoking numerical investigations of the related equations. The
market friction coefficient β is assumed to be always negative, β < 0. And the nonlinear
trend followers are supposed to be characterized by positive feedback, i.e., B > 0.
In these limiting cases, a quick glance at Table 1 tells us that overregulation is always
preferable to the absence of any regulation for both markets with no uncertainty as well
as for markets with complete uncertainty on the fundamental value. Global stability can
be achieved only in regulated markets, while the unregulated certain markets can be only
locally stable.
3.1 no uncertainty (µ→ 0) over-regulated (λ→ 0)
In this case, the nonlinear terms responsible for the collective effects disappear. Specific
collective behavior can not develop in the presence of strongly regulated markets in which
the fundamental value is known information to all investors. Only the linear terms control
the dynamics of Eq. (14):
dy
dt
= αx+ βy . (16)
11
The only fixed point of the dynamics is the equilibrium point {x∗ = 0, y∗ = 0} corresponding
to no mispricing. The eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian, which quantify the stability
of this fixed point, are
J± =
1
2
(
β ±
√
β2 + 4α
)
. (17)
Hence, if the traders have mean-reverting strategies (α < 0), then {0, 0} is a stable fixed
point and the market converges to its equilibrium, x→ 0 and y → 0.
In contrast, if the investors exhibit a speculative behavior with positive feedback on the
price, so that α > 0, then the dynamics becomes globally unstable and mispricing x as well as
mispricing drift y diverge. The market can only be transient. Hence, fully informed irrational
investors blow up the market. Only rational trading is compatible with the existence of strong
regulation and full available public information. This is not a surprise.
3.2 maximum uncertainty (µ→∞) un-regulated (λ→∞)
In this case, Eq. (7) reduces to
dy
dt
= αx+ βy + Ax3 +By3 . (18)
There can exist three fixed points. The equilibrium fixed point {0, 0} is always present, with
the related Jacobian eigenvalues
J±1 =
1
2
(
β ±
√
β2 + 4α
)
. (19)
The two additional fixed points
x∗2,3 = ±
√
− α
A
, y∗2,3 = 0 , (20)
with the corresponding Jacobian eigenvalues
J±2,3 =
1
2
(
β ±
√
β2 − 8α
)
, (21)
exist only if α and A have opposite signs.
For mean-reversing investors (α < 0), only the equilibrium point {0, 0} is stable, the two
other points being either saddle points for A > 0, i.e. with one stable direction and one
unstable direction, or do not exist at all for A < 0.
For speculative traders (α > 0), the point {0, 0} becomes a saddle point. For A > 0,
there are no stable points and all trajectories diverge. When α > 0 and A < 0, the two fixed
points {x∗2,3, 0} are stable, and represent two conventions in the sense of Keynes and Orle´an
(1994), (see also Boyer and Orle´an, 1992; Eymard-Duvernay et al., 2005), in which investors
share a common belief which is self-realized with no real underpinning by a fundamental
valuation. Note that {x∗2, 0} (resp. {x∗3, 0}) corresponds to an overprice (resp. underpriced)
convention.
When α crosses 0, a bifurcation occurs, such that the rational behavior, with just one
stable equilibrium point {0, 0}, transforms into the speculative behavior characterized by the
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two stable convention points {x∗2,3, 0}. This dynamical transition is analogous to the price
symmetry breaking mechanism introduced by Sornette (2000), the difference being that, in
our present case, the symmetry-breaking of {0, 0} into {x∗2,3, 0} occurs with respect to the
reference fundamental price rather than to a vanishing price.
Both for the rational (α < 0) and for the speculative (α > 0) behaviors, the existing
stable fixed points have only finite basins of attraction. This means that all trajectories,
starting inside a given basin, tend to its corresponding fixed point. But any trajectory, with
initial conditions outside the basins of attraction, diverges in a finite time tc as
x ∝ √tc − t , |y| ∝ (tc − t)−1/2 , (22)
for t → tc − 0. This singular behavior occurs, as we said above, due to the complete
uncertainty (µ→ +∞) on the fundamental price and the complete lack of regulation (λ→
+∞), which remove any restriction or constraint on the mispricing. The market can be said
to be only locally stable, but it is globally unstable.
In the limit where the linear terms can be neglected compared to the nonlinear terms, so
that α→ 0 and β → 0, the dynamics reduces to the equation
dy
dt
= Ax3 +By3 , (23)
which is a variant of the Ide-Sornette (2002) model. Then, the basins of attraction disappear
completely. There are no stable fixed points, and all trajectories diverge in finite time. The
model (23) is structurally unstable, since its dynamics sharply changes under infinitesimally
small α and β. Its usefulness lies however in providing a structural description for the
transient behaviors associated with explosive bubbles and their crashes (Ide and Sornette,
2002).
3.3 maximum uncertainty (µ→∞) over-regulated (λ→ 0)
Equation (14) becomes
dy
dt
= αx+ βy + Ax3 . (24)
In this limit where the nonlinear term By3 exp(−y2/λ2) is absent, the impact of trend follow-
ers vanishes (since over-regulation prevents any trend to appear). Mathematically, equation
(24) is known as the Duffing equation.
In the case of mean-reversing traders (α < 0), the equilibrium point {0, 0} is the unique
fixed point. When speculative traders dominate (α > 0), {0, 0} becomes a saddle, while two
other stable fixed points x∗2,3 = ±
√
−α/A appear, provided that A < 0. When A < 0, the
dynamical system is globally stable, with one stable fixed point {0, 0} if α < 0 or with two
stable fixed points {x2,3, 0} if α > 0. When A > 0, then there is one stable fixed point {0, 0}
if α < 0, with a finite basin of attraction. For α > 0 and A > 0, there are no stable fixed
points and all trajectories diverge. Hence for A > 0, the system is globally unstable, since
there are trajectories, starting outside the basin of attraction (when it exists), which diverge.
For speculative traders (α > 0), the market bifurcates either to the overvalued convention
{x∗2 > 0, 0} or to the unvalued convention {x∗3 < 0, 0}.
13
3.4 no uncertainty (µ→ 0) un-regulated (λ→∞)
Equation (14) becomes
dy
dt
= αx+ βy +By3 , (25)
which is known as the Rayleigh equation. Notwithstanding the absence of uncertainty on
the fundamental value, this equation (25) describes a market which allows for speculation
on mispricing (for α > 0) and for nonlinear momentum trading (for B > 0). This is a
priori surprising as the idea that markets aggregate and disseminate information and also
resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and rational
expectations (Lucas, 1972). But, Plott and Sunder (1988) have shown that changing market
institutions and trading instruments may lead to deviations from rational equilibrium. Other
reasons are the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997): real arbitrage of mispricing
require capital and entails risks, which makes mispricing difficult to eliminate in certain cir-
cumstances. In our model, arbitrage is prevented when a majority of traders are speculative
(α > 0) and/or follow nonlinear momentum strategies (B > 0). The fact that a collective
certainty on the fundamental value (µ→ 0) can coexist with speculative behavior and mo-
mentum trading is puzzling but should not surprise. For instance, it is well-documented that
there exist situations in which people simply fail to do what is best even for themselves, in the
face of good, freely available information. Despite stern warnings and mountains of strong
evidence, some people continue to take up smoking (The McDonnell Social Norms Group,
2001), probably due to their less-than-perfect risk perception associated with the available
information and their over-optimism about their longevity and future health (Sloan et al.,
2003). Thus, information should be distinguished from the individual decision process which
may be in contradiction with the direction that the information would favor. Information
should also be distinguished from the aggregate of the individual decision processes which
may be even less related to the public information due to possible feedbacks generated by
interactions between people. A public information on the fundamental value of a stock may
not be fully perceived as a reliable predictor of the market value because investors may have
developed anticipation of the action of other investors which differ from the consequences of
the public information. For instance, agent-based models of interacting investors who are
subjected to their own private information, to the public information and to the influence of
their network of colleagues, may at times deviate from fundamental trading guided by the
public information due to the influence of the other factors as well as their historical belief in
the relative relevance of the different factors (Sornette and Zhou, 2006; Zhou and Sornette,
2006). This justifies to consider equation (12) as a realistic limiting case representing a
possible aggregate behavior of investors.
Only one fixed point {0, 0} exists for equation (25). For α < 0 and B < 0, the system
is globally stable, with all trajectories converging to the stable point {0, 0} of an efficient
market. When α < 0 but B > 0, the point {0, 0} is stable, however its basin of attraction
is finite, so that the system is globally unstable. The appearance of speculative traders
(α > 0) destroys the market for initial conditions or disturbances that bring the mispricing
sufficiently far from zero, i.e., when the market price is sufficiently far from the fundamental
price, for which mispricing trajectories become divergent.
For the sake of completeness, let us mention that, in the artificial case where we consider
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that the market friction coefficient β can become positive, but α < 0 and B < 0, then the
point {0, 0} becomes unstable and there appears a limit cycle according to the Poincare´-
Bendixon theorem (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2002).
4 Analysis of General Dynamics
We now consider the general evolution equations (13,14) with finite values of the parameters
µ and λ characterizing the market uncertainty and liberalization, respectively. As in the
previous section, our analysis is performed in the limit where the stochastic component
σdW is neglected, in order to explore the underlying nonlinear structure of the different
dynamical regimes.
First of all, we need to understand what are the conditions for the existence of stable
fixed points and of other stationary regimes, if available. A first tool is linear analysis. Linear
analysis gives information only on fixed points. In addition, there may exist limit cycles.
However, as is well known, there is no general method for the determination of limit cycles.
Though it is possible to formulate sufficient conditions for the existence of limit cycles, these
conditions have the form of partial differential equations, which, anyway, require themselves
a numerical solution (Giacomini and Viano, 1995). It is then more straightforward to solve
numerically the given system of ordinary differential equations, which we shall do to obtain
an exhaustive description of the whole phase portraits. Below, we thus present the results
of the linear analysis, which includes both the determination of the fixed points and their
stability analysis. We complement the linear analysis with a complete numerical study of
the limit cycles, if any, and of their stability.
4.1 Linear analysis
The fixed points of the dynamical system (13,14) are given by the equations
αx+ Ax3 exp
(
− x
2
µ2
)
= 0 , y = 0 , (26)
whose solutions will be denoted as x∗ and y∗. One evident solution is
x∗1 = 0 , y
∗
1 = 0 , (27)
corresponding to an equilibrium efficient market with no mispricing, when the market price
equals the fundamental value.
There can also exist two other fixed points {x∗2, 0} and {x∗3, 0}, where x∗2,3 are the solutions
to the equation
α+ Ax2 exp
(
− x
2
µ2
)
= 0 . (28)
These additional solutions are possible only when the uncertainty of the fundamental value
is large enough, i.e., for
µ ≥ µc ≡
√
− αe
A
, (29)
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and when the parameters α and A have opposite signs:
α
A
< 0 . (30)
At the threshold value µc,
x∗2,3 = ±µc (µ = µc) . (31)
With increasing uncertainty µ, the absolute values of x∗2,3 decrease. For large µ, we have(
x∗2,3
)2 ≃ − α
A
+
α
µ2A2
(µ≫ 1) , (32)
so that
lim
µ→∞
x∗2,3 = ±
√
− α
A
. (33)
Therefore, the inequality (
x∗2,3
µ
)2
≤ 1 (µc ≤ µ <∞) (34)
is valid in the whole region µ ≥ µc, where the fixed points x∗2,3 exist.
The stability of the fixed points is determined by the properties of the Jacobian matrix
Jˆ = [Jij ] which, in the present case, possesses the elements
J11 ≡ ∂x˙
∂x
= 0 , J12 ≡ ∂x˙
∂y
= 1 ,
J21 ≡ ∂y˙
∂x
= α + 3Ax2
(
1 − 2x
2
3µ2
)
exp
(
− x
2
µ2
)
, (35)
J22 ≡ ∂y˙
∂y
= β + 3By2
(
1 − 2y
2
3λ2
)
exp
(
− y
2
λ2
)
,
where the overdot corresponds to taking the time derivative. The eigenvalues of Jˆ are
J± =
1
2
[
TrJˆ ±
√(
TrJˆ
)2 − 4detJˆ
]
. (36)
Since
TrJˆ = J22 , detJˆ = −J21 , (37)
we get
J± =
1
2
(
J22 ±
√
J222 + 4J21
)
. (38)
At the first fixed point {x∗1, y∗1} = {0, 0}, the eigenvalues J± read
J±1 =
1
2
(
β ±
√
β2 + 4α
)
. (39)
For the fixed points {x∗2,3, 0}, we find
J±2,3 =
1
2

β ±
√√√√√β2 − 8

1−
(
x∗2,3
µ
)2

 . (40)
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First, what can be immediately noticed is that, for the fixed points to be stable, the
friction coefficient β must be negative, as it has been assumed above. If the friction parameter
was positive, there would be no stable fixed points.
If α > 0 and A > 0, the point {0, 0} is unstable, being a saddle point, and the fixed
points {x∗2,3, 0} do not exist. This leaves us with three possible regimes for the signs of α and
A, for which there can exist stable fixed points. To be more concise and precise, we classify
these different cases by ascribing to each of them a name related to the signs of α and A.
Recall that α < 0 corresponds to the mean-reversal behavior of individual traders, while
α > 0, to their speculative behavior. One of the collective behaviors of traders, which is
characterized by the parameter A, can also be either mean-reverting (A < 0), or speculative
(A > 0). This explains the names in the following classification
• α < 0, A < 0: individual and collective mean-reverting market;
• α > 0, A < 0: individual speculative and collective mean-reverting market;
• α < 0, A > 0: individual mean-reverting and collective speculative market.
Below, we analyze in detail these three cases.
4.2 Individual and collective mean-reverting market (α < 0 and
A < 0)
Only one stable fixed point {0, 0} exists. It is a stable node if
− β
2
4
≤ α < 0 ,
or a stable focus when
α < − β
2
4
.
In the latter case, the approach to equilibrium is oscillatory with the effective asymptotic
frequency
ω1 =
√
4|α| − β2 .
For finite µ and λ, the dynamics is much less trivial than in the limiting cases of the
previous Section 3. There appears a number of rather unusual bifurcations. For given
parameters α < 0 and A < 0, distinct dynamics occur as a function of the amount of public
information available on the fundamental price quantified by the parameter µ. Specifically,
a critical threshold µ1 separates two regimes, µ < µ1 versus µ > µ1, where the threshold
value µ1 is a function of α and A.
For α < 0 and A < 0, all dynamical trajectories are bounded. Although the unstable
set of boundaries between different basins of attraction of the various fixed points and limit
cycles can be quite nontrivial, especially for the uncertain markets, all trajectories tend to
one of the attracting sets, either to the stable point {0, 0} or to a stable limit cycle. Since all
trajectories are finite, the dynamical system is Lagrange stable. The stable set, including all
basins of attraction, covers almost all phase plane, excluding the unstable set, having zero
measure. In that sense, the dynamics is globally stable.
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4.2.1 Market with strong public information (0 < µ < µ1)
There exists a level of liberalization λ1 such that, for λ < λ1, there is only the stable fixed
point {0, 0}, as is shown in Fig. 1. Here and in what follows, the phase portrait is defined
in the x − y plane. But for more liberal markets (λ > λ1), in addition to the fixed point
{0, 0}, which remains stable, there appears a stable limit cycle surrounding it, as shown in
Fig. 2. This type of bifurcation is quite unusual. In the standard Hopf bifurcation, the limit
cycle arises around an unstable fixed point (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2002). But in our case,
the point {0, 0} remains stable, while the new stable limit cycle appears. For λ > λ1, the
fixed point {0, 0} has a finite domain of attraction which is embedded within the domain of
attraction of the limit cycle. The appearance of the latter is due to the existence of trend
followers for B > 0. If the sign of B changes to negative, the limit cycle disappears. The
further increase of the liberalization parameter λ leaves the topological picture unchanged,
with one stable point {0, 0} and one stable limit cycle around it. The basin of attraction
of the point {0, 0} does not change much, but the size of the limit cycle rapidly grows with
increasing λ. This is illustrated in Fig. 3, which can be compared with Fig. 2.
4.2.2 Uncertain market (µ1 < µ <∞)
In this case, there exist three liberalization thresholds λ1 < λ2 < λ3. For strictly regulated
market, λ < λ1, there is just one stable point {0, 0}, as in Fig. 4. When the degree of
liberalization lies in the interval λ1 < λ < λ2, one stable point {0, 0} is coexisting with a
limit cycle surrounding it, as in Fig.5. In the interval λ2 < λ < λ3, the unique limit cycle
is replaced by two stable limit cycles, one internal and the other external, both surrounding
the point {0, 0}, as shown in Fig. 6. Increasing further the liberalization λ > λ3 breaks
the internal limit cycle, but the external cycle remains and grows, as shown in Fig. 7. The
limit cycles are due to the existence of nonlinear trend followers: for B < 0, all limit cycles
disappear.
4.3 Individual speculative (α > 0) and collective mean-reverting
(A < 0) market
Let us consider the case where individual traders are speculative (α > 0), but collectively
mean-reversal (A < 0). If there is little uncertainty on the fundamental price (µ < µc, with
µc defined in Eq. (29), then there are no finite attractors of the dynamics, and all trajectories
diverge. This actually implies that the market does not exist. Only when µ > µc, two stable
fixed points {x∗2,3, 0} exist, which are the solutions of Eq. (28). These fixed points are stable
nodes when β2 ≥ β22,3 and stable focuses when β2 < β22,3, where
β2,3 ≡ 8α

1−
(
x∗2,3
µ
)2 . (41)
There is another threshold value µ1 > µc separating different dynamics. Also, there exists
a speculative threshold αc > 0, below and above which dynamics is different. The most
diverse possibilities occur for large uncertainty (µ > µ1) and strongly speculative (α > αc)
markets, which present four regimes, depending on the level of regulation quantified by the
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liberalization parameter λ. Less speculative (α < αc) and less uncertain (µ < µ1) markets
exhibit only a part of these regimes. It is therefore convenient to start the investigation from
the most ramified case.
As shown in the classification presented in the next subsections, the general feature of
this class of markets with individual speculation and collective mean-reverting properties is
that the dynamics is only locally stable. There always exist the basins of infinity preventing
a global market stability.
4.3.1 Uncertain market (µ1 < µ <∞) with strong speculation (αc < α <∞)
There are three liberalization thresholds, λ1 < λ2 < λ3 and four dynamic regimes. When
the market is strictly regulated (0 < λ < λ1), there are two stable fixed points {±s, 0}.
Here we again use the short-hand notation x∗2,3 ≡ ±s, with s > 0. The related phase
portrait is shown in Fig. 8. The point {s, 0} corresponds to a positive convention, while
{−s, 0} corresponds to a negative convention. The basins of attraction of these points have
infinite measure, however they do not cover the whole phase plane. To their left and right
lie the basins of infinity, where all trajectories diverge. Increasing the market uncertainty
µ increases the basins of attraction of {±s, 0}, but the basin of infinity disappears only in
the limit of completely uncertain markets, µ → ∞, which reduces to the Duffing equation
studied in Section 3.3. Thus, the basin of infinity, with infinite measure, exists for any finitely
uncertain market, no matter how large µ is.
For weaker regulations, in the interval of liberalization λ1 < λ < λ2, there are two
speculative stable points {±s, 0} and two stable limit cycles around each of them, as shown
in Fig. 9. There are four basins of attraction, but their union again does not cover the whole
plane, since there are two basins of infinity.
For still more unregulated markets, in the interval of liberalization λ2 < λ < λ3, two
separate limit cycles of the previous regime merge into one big stable cycle surrounding both
fixed points, as shown in Fig. 10. Again, their total basins of attraction do not cover the
whole phase plane. When the market is weakly regulated, such that λ3 < λ <∞, the limit
cycle of the previous regime breaks up, and only the two stable fixed points {±s, 0} remain.
The resulting phase portrait is depicted in Fig. 11. The basin of attraction of these fixed
points does not cover the whole phase plane.
4.3.2 Uncertain market (µ1 < µ <∞) with weak speculation (0 < α < αc)
In this case, there exist two liberalization thresholds, λ1 < λ2, and three dynamic regimes.
When the market regulation is strict, 0 < λ < λ1, there are two stable points, {±s, 0},
similar to the situation shown in Fig. 8. When the liberalization parameter lies in the
interval λ1 < λ < λ2, there appear a stable limit cycle around these points, analogously
to the case shown in Fig. 10. And for a strongly deregulated market, with λ2 < λ < ∞,
there exist just two stable points {±s, 0}, and no cycles, as in the case shown in Fig. 11.
In summary, the weakly speculative (α < αc) uncertain market differs from the strongly
speculative (α > αc) one by the absence of the intermediate regime with two points and two
cycles, which occurs for the latter market, as seen in Fig. 9. The phase plane again consists
of the union of the basins of attraction and of two basins of infinity.
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4.3.3 Intermediate uncertainty market (µc < µ < µ1)
The phase portrait is topologically the same for any α > 0 and λ. There exist only two
stable fixed points {±s, 0}. No cycles appear. The dynamics is analogous to that illustrated
in Fig. 8. The basin of attraction never covers the whole phase plane. Recall that the fixed
points exist only if µ > µc. A speculative (α > 0) market, with rather strong certainty
µ < µc, cannot exist at all, since all trajectories diverge.
4.4 Individual mean-reverting (α < 0) and collective speculative
(A > 0) market
Such a situation can develop, when the majority of traders on the average are rational, but
there are groups of speculators whose action can eventually dominate at times of large de-
viations from the fundamental value. Again, the level of public uncertainty in the market
concerning the fundamental price drives predominantly its dynamics. There are two thresh-
olds, µc and µ1, characterizing the market uncertainty. For each given µ, the dynamics
depend on the level of liberalization λ.
All the various regimes of collectively speculative markets with individual mean-reverting
behavior are globally stable. All trajectories go either to one of the stable fixed points or to
one of the stable limit cycles, as we now classify.
4.4.1 Small uncertainty on the fundamental value (0 < µ < µc)
When the market is strictly regulated, such that 0 < λ < λ1, there exists just one stable
point {0, 0}. The phase portrait is shown in Fig. 12. The basin of attraction is the whole
phase plane.
If the well-informed market is weakly regulated, so that λ1 < λ < ∞, there appears a
stable limit cycle around the stable point {0, 0} as illustrated by Fig. 13. There are two
basins of attraction, one corresponding to the stable point and the other one to the cycle.
The total stable set, consisting of the union of these basins of attraction, covers the whole
phase plane. The unstable set, composed of the boundaries between the basins of attraction,
has zero measure.
Increasing the liberalization parameter λ leaves the topology of the phase portrait similar
to that shown in Fig. 13, with one stable point {0, 0} and a stable cycle around it. However,
a slight increase of the liberalization λ substantially increases the limit cycle and deforms its
shape, as shown in Fig. 14.
4.4.2 Intermediate level of uncertainty (µc < µ < µ1)
As soon as the uncertainty µ on the fundamental value overpasses the threshold µc defined
in Eq. (15), there appear three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0}. For strictly regulated
markets (0 < λ < λ1), only these three points exist for a market characterized by an
intermediate uncertainty (µ < µ1). The corresponding phase portrait is shown in Fig. 15.
The total stable set covers the whole phase plane.
For the market with intermediate uncertainty and weak regulation (λ1 < λ < ∞), in
addition to the same three stable points just mentioned, a stable limit cycle appears which
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surrounds all of them, as represented in Fig. 16. The total stable set, as before, covers the
whole phase plane.
4.4.3 Uncertain market (µ1 < µ <∞)
There are two thresholds of market liberalization, λ1 < λ2. For a strictly regulated market
(0 < λ < λ1), there are three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0}. The phase portrait
is analogous to that shown in Fig. 15, with the only difference that the points {±s, 0} are
shifted away from the center {0, 0}.
For intermediate regulation (λ1 < λ < λ2), the phase portrait changes, with the existence
of three fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0} and two stable limit cycles around each of the latter
points {±s, 0}. This is shown in Fig. 17. The whole phase plane is covered by the total
stable set.
With the increase of the liberalization parameter λ in the interval λ2 < λ <∞, the two
limit cycles of the previous regime break up and combine into one big limit cycle surrounding
all three fixed points. The corresponding phase portrait is shown in Fig. 18. As in the
previous cases, except for the boundaries between the different domains of attraction which
form a set of zero measure, the total stable set covers the whole phase plane.
4.5 Summary of the classification of different market types
The classification presented in the previous sections demonstrate a very large variety of
possible markets. There are 6 kinds of markets with individual and collective mean-reverting
behaviors, 8 variants of markets with individual speculative and collective mean-reverting
behaviors, and 7 types of markets with individual mean-reverting and collective speculative
behaviors. Thus, in total, there exist 21 types of markets. In order to better compare these
different markets, we summarize their properties in Tables 2, 3, and 4. As explained above,
this classification sorts out markets according to three basic types:
• the individual and collective mean-reverting markets (α < 0, A < 0) (Table 2);
• the individual speculative and collective mean-reverting markets (α > 0, A < 0) (Table
3);
• the individual mean-reverting and collective speculative markets (α < 0, A > 0) (Table
4).
Then, a second level of classification is performed on the basis of the level of liberalization.
For brevity, we refer to a strictly regulated market as rigid and to a weakly regulated market
as soft. Intermediate cases are termed mid-rigid or mid-soft with a meaning which is clear
from the context. In the right columns of the Tables, the corresponding attractors are shown.
The stable fixed points are denoted as {0, 0} and {±s, 0}. The notation C0 implies a stable
limit cycle surrounding the point {0, 0} and C ′0 is another limit cycle around this point.
The stable cycles Cs and C−s are around the points {s, 0} and {−s, 0}, respectively. The
limit cycle C±s surrounds both these points {±s, 0}. Finally, the notation C0,±s represents
a stable limit cycle surrounding all three points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0}.
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With respect to their topological properties, not all markets are distinct in our classifi-
cation presented in the Tables 2-4. In other words, not all markets presented as different
in the Tables 2-4 possess topologically different phase portraits. However, the classification
presented in Tables 2-4 is convenient for practical purposes, as it distinguishes both quan-
titatively and qualitatively different types of markets with respect to their characteristics
in terms of level of uncertainty and of regulation. Markets with low uncertainty and strict
regulation display the simplest dynamics. The complexity of the dynamics increases for
more uncertain and less regulated markets. The appearance of speculative traders in uncer-
tain markets makes their dynamics quite nontrivial, even if the regulation is rather strict.
In this way, the speculative points {±s, 0} appear, corresponding to positive or negative
conventions. The existence of trend followers leads to the occurrence of limit cycles.
5 Study of Stochastic Dynamics
The full dynamics described by equations (13,14) involves in addition the stochastic term
σdW . As explained in section 2.4, the interplay of the structure of attractors of the nonlinear
deterministic dynamics with the stochasticity σdW can be expected to provide a dynamic
underpinning for many stylized facts and properties of financial prices. As we have discussed,
the nonlinear deterministic dynamics embodies the interplay between the aggregate effects of
several market and agent contributing factors. Complementarily, stochasticity models both
the granularity decorating these different contributions as well as exogenous perturbations
such as news and sunspots. This section provides a first numerical exploration of some of
the more interesting properties for which we offer a qualitative intuitive interpretation based
on the classification of the 21 market regimes obtained above.
To investigate the influence of stochasticity, we solve the stochastic differential equations
(13) and (14) numerically by employing the Euler discretization scheme. Then the discretized
version of Eq. (13) reads
x(ti +∆t)− x(ti) = y(ti)∆t + σ
√
∆t R(ti) (42)
where ti, with i = 1, 2, . . . are the discrete times in units of the time step ∆t. The random
numbers R(ti) are generated with the standard Gaussian distribution (zero mean and unit
variance). The amplitude of stochasticity is controlled by the volatility parameter σ. Be-
low, we present several figures illustrating the influence of increasing σ on the mispricing
trajectories x(t). Recall that, by definition (1), x(t) is the log-price log p(t) shifted by the
fundamental log-value. We examine in turns some of the most illustrative cases.
Strictly regulated markets with low uncertainty exhibit a rather simple dynamics and, as
such, their qualitative properties are the least modified by the presence of stochasticity. For
such markets with mean-reversing investors (α < 0, A < 0) whose phase portrait is shown in
Fig. 1, the trajectory x(t), in the presence of stochasticity, follows an approximate Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (random walk with mean reversal) around the efficient market state {0, 0},
slightly modified by the presence of the nonlinear terms. While this may provide a source for
some on the nonlinearities that have been documented (Hsieh, 1995), much more interesting
and complicated price trajectories appear for markets characterized by the coexistence of
several attractors.
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Let us consider, for instance, a weakly regulated market with low uncertainty and all
mean-reverting agents (α < 0, A < 0). Its phase portrait, given in Fig. 3, shows the co-
existence of the equilibrium fixed point {0, 0} with a non-linear periodic cycle. Typical
trajectories, starting with the same initial conditions x(0) = 0, y(0) = 1, under increasing
volatility σ, are presented in Fig. 19. In the absence of volatility, the initial momentum
y(0) = 1 is small enough that the intial conditions belong to the domain of attraction of the
equilibrium fixed point {0, 0}, so that the mispricing x(t) converges to the efficient market
state, as shown in Fig. 19 (a). In the presence of a small volatility σ = 0.1, typical trajectories
converge to a neighborhood of {0, 0}, and then exhibit an approximate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process around the efficient market state {0, 0}, slightly modified by the presence of the
nonlinear terms, as shown in Fig. 19 (b). A typical trajectory for a larger volatility σ = 0.5
leads to shifts between the domain of attraction of the fixed point {0, 0} to the nonlinear
cycle. In the example shown in Fig. 19 (c), up to t = 10, the mispricing is undergoing
an approximate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process around the efficient market state {0, 0}. After
this time, one can observe a transition to a quasi-periodic cycle associated with the domain
of attraction of the large nonlinear cycle. Since the domain of attraction of the later is
much larger than that of the fixed point {0, 0}, a return to approximate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process around the efficient market state {0, 0} is not excluded but will be rare for the choice
of parameters of this figure. For even larger volatility σ = 5 as shown in Fig 19 (d), the
mispricing is following a quasi-periodic random walk, with intermittent trapping close to
the efficient market state {0, 0} followed by re-captures by the quasi-periodic random walk.
Such mispricing could be a good representative of noisy business cycles (Tvede, 2006).
For markets characterized by more than just two basins of attraction, the presence of
stochasticity brings in the possibility for some domains of attractions to be destroyed by
fusion with others, while different domains of attractions may survive and keep their qual-
itative shape and properties. Conside for instance the case of slightly deregulated markets
with large uncertainty, with individual speculative and collective mean-reverting agents,
whose phase portrait in the absence of stochasticity is shown in Fig. 9. By showing typical
trajectories, Fig. 20 illustrates the influence of increasing the volatility. In the absence of
stochasticity, the phase portrait of Fig. 9 shows the existence of two stable fixed points and
two stable limit cycles around each of the points. In the absence of stochasticity σ = 0,
any trajectory, starting inside the basin of attraction of one of the fixed points, converges
to the latter as shown in Fig. 20 (a). For weak stochasticity (σ = 0.1), typical mispricing
trajectories exhibit rather regular oscillations, suggesting a kind of resonance, as shown in
Fig. 20 (b). With a slightly stronger volatility (σ = 0.3), typical trajectories first oscillate
around the fixed point before passing over to the domain of attraction of the limit cycle
surrounding the fixed point, as shown in Fig. 20 (c). In that sense, the basin of attraction
of the fixed point has been destroyed, though the limit cycle has not been changed much,
the cycles being decorated by a random noise, forming a kind of stochastic trajectory co-
integrated with the initial unperturbed cycle. With large volatility (σ = 3) as shown in Fig.
20 (d), one can observe jumps between the two noisy cycles, one (resp., the other) that can
be interpreted as a positive (resp. negative) business cycle with a valuation above (resp.
below) the fundamental price.
The gradual destruction of the basins of attraction, under increasing volatility, is a general
phenomenon existing for different kinds of attractors. This is demonstrated in Figs. 21
23
and 22 for two different markets characterized by the phase portraits of Fig. 15 and Fig.
17, respectively, in the absence of stochasticity. The former case corresponds to a strictly
regulated market with intermediate uncertainty, exhibiting three stable fixed points. With
increasing volatility, one can observe that typical trajectories that start in the basin of
attraction of one of the fixed points, as in Fig. 21 (a), are mildly perturbed with a mean-
reversion stochastic behavior around the fixed point over long time periods for weak volatility
(σ = 0.2) as in Fig. 21 (b), but can jump eventually to the basin of attraction of the
neighboring fixed points. The random waiting times between jumps become shorter for
larger volatility as illustrated in Fig. 21 (c), which shows a jump from a stochastic dynamics
in the neighborhood of the positive convention fixed point to a stochastic dynamics in the
vicinity of the equilibrium fixed point. At longer time scales and/or for larger volatility, one
can observe alternate jumps between the three fixed points with transient random excursions
around each of these fixed points, as shown in Fig. 21 (d). Technically, the mathematical
theory describing the statistics of the waiting times between such jumps can be developed,
based on the concept of “effective action” (Eyink, 1998), which generalizes reaction rate
theory or the Kramers’ problem (Ha¨nggi et al., 1990) for the case where the dynamics is
Hamiltonian to the non-variational case. This behavior involving random jumps between
distinct stochastic phases associated with different underlying fixed points or attractors is
reminiscent of the regime shifts between equilibrium to positive or negative conventions and
between them.
The rich phase structure of markets with intermediate regulation and large uncertainty,
whose phase portrait is given in Fig. 17, evolves with increasing volatility by a progressive
destruction of the attractors which occur in several stages. There are initially three fixed
points and two limit cycles around two of the points. A typical trajectory, starting close to
one of the fixed points inside the related cycle, as in Fig. 22 (a) (σ = 0), oscillates around
this point for intermediate values of the volatility (σ = 1), as shown in Fig. 22 (b). For
larger volatility (σ = 3), the fixed point loses its attraction and the stochastic trajectory
evolves to a random noise decorating the limit cycle surrounding it, as in Fig. 22 (c). With
the increase of the volatility to large values (σ = 5), typical mispricing trajectories alternate
randomly between the two former limit cycles, with random added structures, as in Fig.
22 (d). The stochastic nonlinear dynamics described in Figs. 21 and 22 provides a natural
mechanism for regime shifts observed in real financial markets.
It is worth stressing that the basins of attraction of limit cycles, when they appear,
are practically always larger than the basins of attraction of the coexisting fixed points.
As a consequence, increasing the volatility destroys first the basins of the fixed points and
only later the basins of the limit cycles. In that sense, the limit cycles are more stable to
increasing volatility, suggesting a mechanism by which business cycles play a dominant role in
explaining the financial price dynamics, while the relative explanatory power of fundamental
pricing, and even of systematic stable deviations such as convention pricing, remains smaller.
A clear example of the situation in which increasing volatility destroys the basin of
attraction of all fixed points while only disturbing a limit cycle is presented in Fig. 23. This
corresponds to a weakly regulated uncertain market characterized by the phase portrait
shown in Fig. 18. With zero volatility, there are three fixed points and a single limit cycle
surrounding them. Going from vanishing to non-zero volatility very quickly destroys the
basins of attraction of all three fixed points. But stochastic oscillations in the neighborhood
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of the limit cycle persist for rather large volatilities, as illustrated in Fig 23 (b).
Long-time simulations exemplify the transitions between the trapping regions, which
are the remnant structures associated with the fixed points and limit cycles in absence of
stochasticity. Figs. 24 and 25 show two typical trajectories of the mispricing for two different
markets, over a timespan an order of magnitude larger than in the previous Figs. 19 to 23.
Fig. 24 shows a typical trajectory of the mispricing x(t) for a strictly regulated market
with intermediate uncertainty, corresponding to the phase portrait of Fig. 15 in absence of
stochasticity, for a volatility σ = 2. The stochasticity induces random transitions between
mostly the three fixed points, equilibrium ({0, 0}) and the positive and negative conventions
({−s, 0} and {s, 0}). The maximal number of attractors, which is five in our model, is
obtained for uncertain weakly regulated markets with individual reverting and collectively
speculating agents, corresponding to the phase portrait shown in Fig. 17. Under the influence
of stochasticity, the typical trajectory depicted in Fig. 25 jumps between the two limit cycles
around the convention fixed points {−s, 0} and {s, 0}. One can also observe that, inside
each limit cycle phase, the trajectory also transiently oscillates around the corresponding
fixed point. Oscillations around the point {0, 0} do not last long, because the trapping
region around this point is smaller than the trapping regions of the limit cycles. Thus,
the existence of even weak noise destroys the attractors, transforming the related basins of
attraction into global trapping regions in which the dynamics is erratic. The local properties,
at each given moment of time t, can be characterized by such time-dependent quantities as
local stability indices and local expansion exponents (Yukalov, 2002, 2003). When the noise
is very weak, a trajectory can practically forever live inside one of the trapping regions. But
increasing noise induces the trajectories to jump more frequently between different trapping
regions. The larger a trapping region, the longer is the time spent by the trajectory inside
it. The transitions between different trapping regions correspond to transitions between
different market regimes, such as the efficient-market state, positive or negative conventions,
and business cycles. More detailed applications to particular markets will be studied in our
subsquent papers.
In summary, stochasticity modifies the classification in terms of attractors consisting of
fixed points and limit cycles, as follows. First, strictly speaking, attractors disappear and
are replaced by trapping regions, because stochasticity enables the trajectory to eventually
escape from any domain of attractions. However, it remains sensible to think of attractors
in terms of trapping domains in which the stochastic trajectory remains confined for some
significant time before eventually escaping, perhaps being reinjecting at a later time, and
so on. The trapping time is all the longer, the smaller is the volatility. Thus, for weak
stochasticity, the trapping domains are closely approximated by the basins of attractions
and the stochastic dynamics can be approximated by random walks trapped around the
attractors (fixed points and limit cycles) sometimes jumping to other attractors and so on.
As the amplitude of the stochasticity is increased, the partition of trajectories in terms of
trapping and jumps become blurred for the fixed points, and especially the equilibrium fixed
point which has often the smallest domain of attraction. In contrast, the trapping regions
inherited from the basin of attractions of the limit cycles, when they exist, remain better
defined in the sense that typical trajectories are found to remain trapped for significant times
in such regions before jumps in fast time to other regions. For still stronger volatility, the
trapping regions associated with the cycles eventually fuse together and typical trajectories
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become random walk-like with nonlinear chaotic modulations.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed novel evolution equations of nonequilibrium markets, based on general
symmetry and structural considerations. The obtained equations (13, 14) take into account
the rational or speculative behavior of individual traders, market friction, the possibility of
collective speculative behavior, the existence of trend followers, the influence of uncertainty
on the fundamental value and the level of market regulation. The dynamics resulting from
these equations turns out to be extremely rich, yielding rather nontrivial phase portraits and
a variety of different regimes, evolving from one to another through complex bifurcations.
We have found 21 different types of markets. One of these markets is the efficient market
equilibrium. But there are 20 other types of markets, some being characterized by positive
or negative conventions, transient bubbles and crashes, as well as rather complex business
cycles, which coexist with the equilibrium fixed point.
In general, for low and intermediate uncertainty, only fixed points exist, with the equilib-
rium point possibly coexisting with a positive and a negative convention. The corresponding
stochastic dynamics is co-integrated with the price corresponding to one of these fixed points,
but not for ever, as the coexistence between the three fixed points implies that the dynamics
jumps spontaneously from one regime to another at random times. For large uncertainty
and for weak regulations, limit business cycles appear in addition, competing with the other
fixed points. The theory predicts transient co-integration of the observed price with either
the fundamental price, one convention price or a regular nonlinear business cycle, followed
by sudden jumps to another transient co-integration with one of these regimes. As a conse-
quence, stochasticity blurs the basins of attractions, changing them into transient trapping
regions, and making these trapping regions progressively merge when the intensity (volatil-
ity) of stochasticity increases.
Applications and calibration of this general theory to particular markets will be developed
in separate publications.
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Table Captions
Table 1. Limiting cases of markets. The market friction coefficient β is assumed to be
always negative, β < 0, and the nonlinear trend followers are supposed to be characterized
by positive feedback, B > 0.
Table 2. Different types of markets with individual and collective mean-reverting agents
(α < 0, A < 0). In this case, the equilibrium point is also present, corresponding to the
co-integrated observed and fundamental prices. One or two limit “business” cycles appear
and coexist with the equilibrium point for sufficiently unregulated markets.
Table 3. Different types of markets with individual speculative and collective mean-
reverting agents (α > 0, A < 0). For low and intermediate uncertainty, only fixed points
exist, the equilibrium point coexisting with a positive and a negative conventions. The cor-
responding stochastic dynamics is co-integrated with the price corresponding to one of these
fixed points, but not for ever, as the coexistence between the three fixed points implies that
the dynamics jumps spontaneously from one regime to another at random times. For large
uncertainty and for weak regulations, limit business cycles appear in addition, competing
with the other fixed points.
Table 4. Different types of markets with individual mean-reverting and collective spec-
ulative agents (α < 0, A > 0). The larger uncertainty and weaker regulations introduce
more coexisting fixed points and limit cycles.
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1. Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with low uncertainty and individual
as well as collective mean-reverting agents (α < 0, A < 0). The parameters are: α = −1,
A = −10, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
Fig. 2. Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with low uncertainty and individual
as well as collective mean-reverting agents The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 2. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a limit cycle.
Fig. 3. Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty and individual as well as
collective mean-reverting agents, with increasing deregulation. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = −10, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 3. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a growing limit cycle.
Fig. 4. Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with large uncertainty and indi-
vidual as well as collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
Fig. 5. Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective
mean-reverting agents, with slightly increased liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = −10, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 2. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a limit cycle.
Fig. 6. Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective mean-
reverting agents, with intermediate liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 4. Stable point {0, 0} and two limit cycles, internal and external.
Fig. 7. Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective
mean-reverting agents, with strong liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 5. Stable point {0, 0} and one external limit cycle.
Fig. 8. Phase portrait of an uncertain strictly regulated market with individual specu-
lative and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 1. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0}.
Fig. 9. Phase portrait of an uncertain slightly deregulated market with individual
speculative and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 2. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0} and two limit cycles around
each of them.
Fig. 10. Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual speculative and collective
mean-reverting agents, and with intermediate level of liberalization. The parameters are:
α = 5, A = −1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 3. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0} and one big
stable limit cycle surrounding both points.
Fig. 11. Phase portrait of an uncertain strongly deregulated market with individual
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speculative and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 4. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0}.
Fig. 12. Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with low uncertainty, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
Fig. 13. Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty, lower regulation, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 2. One stable fixed point {0, 0} and a stable limit cycle
around it.
Fig. 14. Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty, with increased liberalization
and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 4. The stable fixed point {0, 0} and a stable
limit cycle, which is increased and deformed.
Fig. 15. Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with intermediate uncertainty,
and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 1. Three stable fixed points {0, 0} and {±s, 0}.
Fig. 16. Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with intermediate uncertainty,
and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 2. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0},
and a stable limit cycle surrounding all of them.
Fig. 17. Phase portrait of a market with an intermediate regulation, with large uncer-
tainty, and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The param-
eters are: α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 3, λ = 2. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0}
and {±s, 0}, and two stable limit cycles surrounding the points {±s, 0}.
Fig. 18. Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with large uncertainty, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 3, λ = 3. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0}, with a
stable limit cycle surrounding all of them.
Fig. 19. Influence of increasing volatility on the mispricing trajectory x(t), with the
initial conditions x(0) = 0 and y(0) = 1, for the case of a low-uncertainty liberal market with
all mean-reverting agents. The corresponding phase portrait in the absence of stochasticity
is given by Fig. 3. Switching on the stochasticity yields the following trajectories: (a) σ = 0;
(b) σ = 0.1; (c) σ = 0.5; (d) σ = 5. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
Fig. 20. Influence of stochasticity on the mispricing trajectory x(t), with the initial
conditions x(0) = 3 and y(0) = 0, for the uncertain slightly deregulated market with indi-
vidual speculative and collective reverting agents. All market parameters are as in Fig. 9.
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The increasing stochasticity results in the following trajectories: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.1; (c)
σ = 0.3; (d) σ = 3.
Fig. 21. Influence of stochasticity on the strictly regulated market with intermediate
uncertainty, whose phase portrait and market parameters are given by Fig. 15. Initial
conditions are: x(0) = 1.5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameters are: (a) σ = 0; (b)
σ = 0.2; (c) σ = 1; (d) σ = 3.
Fig. 22. Influence of stochasticity on an uncertain market with an intermediate regu-
lation. Initial conditions: x(0) = 5 and y(0) = 0. The related phase portrait and market
parameters are from Fig. 17. The stochasticity strength is regulated by the parameter σ in
the following way: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 1; (c) σ = 3; (d) σ = 5.
Fig. 23. Influence of stochasticity on a weakly regulated uncertain market represented
by the phase portrait of Fig. 18. Initial conditions: x(0) = 1 and y(0) = 0. All market
parameters are the same as in the latter figure. Here, the stochasticity parameters are: (a)
σ = 0; (b) σ = 3.
Fig. 24. Long-time behavior of the mispricing trajectories demonstrating the jumps
between three trapping regions around the points {0, 0}, {−s, 0}, and {s, 0}. The market
parameters are the same as in Fig. 15 for a strictly regulated market with intermediate uncer-
tainty, and with individual reverting while collectively speculative agents. Initial conditions
are: x(0) = 1.5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameter is σ = 0.9.
Fig. 25. Long-time behavior of the mispricing for the uncertain weakly regulated
market with individual reverting and collectively speculative agents, characterized by the
phase portrait of Fig. 17. All market parameters are the same as in this figure. Initial
conditions are: x(0) = 5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameter is σ = 2. The trajectory
jumps between the trapping regions corresponding to the points {0, 0}, {−s, 0}, and {s, 0},
and the trapping regions related to the cycles C−s and Cs.
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Market Globally stable Locally stable
super-certain (µ→ 0) {0, 0} α < 0
overregulated (λ→ 0)
super-certain (µ→ 0) {0, 0} α < 0
unregulated (λ→∞)
super-uncertain (µ→∞) {0, 0} α < 0, A < 0 {0, 0} α < 0, A > 0
overregulated (λ→ 0) {±s, 0} α > 0, A < 0
super-uncertain (µ→∞) {0, 0} α < 0
unregulated (λ→∞) {±s, 0} α > 0, A < 0
Table 1: Limiting cases of markets. The market friction coefficient β is assumed to be
always negative, β < 0, and the nonlinear trend followers are supposed to be characterized
by positive feedback, B > 0.
35
α < 0, A < 0 regulation attractors
low uncertainty rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {0, 0}
0 < µ < µ1 soft: λ1 < λ <∞ {0, 0} C0
high uncertainty rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {0, 0}
µ1 < µ <∞ mid-rigid: λ1 < λ < λ2 {0, 0} C0
mid-soft: λ2 < λ < λ3 {0, 0} C0 C ′0
soft: λ3 < λ <∞ {0, 0} C ′0
Table 2: Different types of markets with individual and collective mean-reverting agents
(α < 0, A < 0). In this case, the equilibrium point is also present, corresponding to the
co-integrated observed and fundamental prices. One or two limit “business” cycles appear
and coexist with the equilibrium point for sufficiently unregulated markets.
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α > 0, A < 0 speculation regulation attractors
intermediate uncertainty
µc < µ < µ1 any: 0 < α <∞ any: 0 < λ <∞ {±s, 0}
large uncertainty weak rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {±s, 0}
µ1 < µ <∞ 0 < α < αc mid-soft: λ1 < λ < λ2 {±s, 0} C±s
soft: λ2 < λ <∞ {±s, 0}
large uncertainty strong rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {±s, 0}
µ1 < µ <∞ αc < α <∞ mid-rigid: λ1 < λ < λ2 {±s, 0} C−s Cs
mid-soft: λ2 < λ < λ3 {±s, 0} C±s
soft: λ3 < λ <∞ {±s, 0}
Table 3: Different types of markets with individual speculative and collective mean-reverting
agents (α > 0, A < 0). For low and intermediate uncertainty, only fixed points exist, the
equilibrium point coexisting with a positive and a negative conventions. The corresponding
stochastic dynamics is co-integrated with the price corresponding to one of these fixed points,
but not for ever, as the coexistence between the three fixed points implies that the dynamics
jumps spontaneously from one regime to another at random times. For large uncertainty
and for weak regulations, limit business cycles appear in addition, competing with the other
fixed points.
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α < 0, A > 0 regulation attractors
low uncertainty rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {0, 0}
0 < µ < µc soft: λ1 < λ <∞ {0, 0} C0
intermediate uncertainty rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {0, 0} {±s, 0}
µc < µ < µ1 soft: λ1 < λ <∞ {0, 0} {±s, 0} C0,±s
large uncertainty rigid: 0 < λ < λ1 {0, 0} {±s, 0}
µ1 < µ <∞ mid-soft: λ1 < λ < λ2 {0, 0} {±s, 0} C−s Cs
soft: λ2 < λ <∞ {0, 0} {±s, 0} C0,±s
Table 4: Different types of markets with individual mean-reverting and collective speculative
agents (α < 0, A > 0). The larger uncertainty and weaker regulations introduce more
coexisting fixed points and limit cycles.
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Figure 1: Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with low uncertainty and individual
as well as collective mean-reverting agents (α < 0, A < 0). The parameters are: α = −1,
A = −10, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
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Figure 2: Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with low uncertainty and individual
as well as collective mean-reverting agents The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 2. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a limit cycle.
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Figure 3: Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty and individual as well as collective
mean-reverting agents, with increasing deregulation. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 3. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a growing limit cycle.
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Figure 4: Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with large uncertainty and individual
as well as collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
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Figure 5: Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective mean-
reverting agents, with slightly increased liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1, A =
−10, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 2. Stable fixed point {0, 0} and a limit cycle.
Figure 6: Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective mean-
reverting agents, with intermediate liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10,
β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 4. Stable point {0, 0} and two limit cycles, internal and external.
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Figure 7: Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual as well as collective mean-
reverting agents, with strong liberalization. The parameters are: α = −1, A = −10, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 5. Stable point {0, 0} and one external limit cycle.
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Figure 8: Phase portrait of an uncertain strictly regulated market with individual speculative
and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1, β = −1, B = 1,
µ = 5, λ = 1. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0}.
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Figure 9: Phase portrait of an uncertain slightly deregulated market with individual specu-
lative and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 2. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0} and two limit cycles around each of
them.
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Figure 10: Phase portrait of an uncertain market with individual speculative and collective
mean-reverting agents, and with intermediate level of liberalization. The parameters are:
α = 5, A = −1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 3. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0} and one big
stable limit cycle surrounding both points.
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Figure 11: Phase portrait of an uncertain strongly deregulated market with individual spec-
ulative and collective mean-reverting agents. The parameters are: α = 5, A = −1, β = −1,
B = 1, µ = 5, λ = 4. Two stable fixed points {±s, 0}.
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Figure 12: Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with low uncertainty, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 1. One stable fixed point {0, 0}.
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Figure 13: Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty, lower regulation, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 2. One stable fixed point {0, 0} and a stable limit cycle
around it.
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Figure 14: Phase portrait of a market with low uncertainty, with increased liberalization
and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 1, λ = 4. The stable fixed point {0, 0} and a stable
limit cycle, which is increased and deformed.
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Figure 15: Phase portrait of a strictly regulated market with intermediate uncertainty, and
with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 1. Three stable fixed points {0, 0} and {±s, 0}.
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Figure 16: Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with intermediate uncertainty, and
with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 2, λ = 2. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0},
and a stable limit cycle surrounding all of them.
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Figure 17: Phase portrait of a market with an intermediate regulation, with large uncertainty,
and with individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are:
α = −1, A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 3, λ = 2. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0},
and two stable limit cycles surrounding the points {±s, 0}.
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Figure 18: Phase portrait of a weakly regulated market with large uncertainty, and with
individual mean-reverting and collectively speculating agents. The parameters are: α = −1,
A = 1, β = −1, B = 1, µ = 3, λ = 3. Three stable fixed points, {0, 0} and {±s, 0}, with a
stable limit cycle surrounding all of them.
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Figure 19: Influence of increasing volatility on the mispricing trajectory x(t), with the initial
conditions x(0) = 0 and y(0) = 1, for the case of a low-uncertainty liberal market with all
mean-reverting agents. The corresponding phase portrait in the absence of stochasticity is
given by Fig. 3. Switching on the stochasticity yields the following trajectories: (a) σ = 0;
(b) σ = 0.1; (c) σ = 0.5; (d) σ = 5. All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
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Figure 20: Influence of stochasticity on the mispricing trajectory x(t), with the initial con-
ditions x(0) = 3 and y(0) = 0, for the uncertain slightly deregulated market with individual
speculative and collective reverting agents. All market parameters are as in Fig. 9. The
increasing stochasticity results in the following trajectories: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 0.1; (c)
σ = 0.3; (d) σ = 3.
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Figure 21: Influence of stochasticity on the strictly regulated market with intermediate
uncertainty, whose phase portrait and market parameters are given by Fig. 15. Initial
conditions are: x(0) = 1.5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameters are: (a) σ = 0; (b)
σ = 0.2; (c) σ = 1; (d) σ = 3.
59
Figure 22: Influence of stochasticity on an uncertain market with an intermediate regulation.
Initial conditions: x(0) = 5 and y(0) = 0. The related phase portrait and market parameters
are from Fig. 17. The stochasticity strength is regulated by the parameter σ in the following
way: (a) σ = 0; (b) σ = 1; (c) σ = 3; (d) σ = 5.
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Figure 23: Influence of stochasticity on a weakly regulated uncertain market represented
by the phase portrait of Fig. 18. Initial conditions: x(0) = 1 and y(0) = 0. All market
parameters are the same as in the latter figure. Here, the stochasticity parameters are: (a)
σ = 0; (b) σ = 3.
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Figure 24: Long-time behavior of the mispricing trajectories demonstrating the jumps be-
tween three trapping regions around the points {0, 0}, {−s, 0}, and {s, 0}. The market
parameters are the same as in Fig. 15 for a strictly regulated market with intermediate
uncertainty, and with individual reverting while collectively speculative agents. Initial con-
ditions are: x(0) = 1.5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameter is σ = 0.9.
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Figure 25: Long-time behavior of the mispricing for the uncertain weakly regulated market
with individual reverting and collectively speculative agents, characterized by the phase
portrait of Fig. 17. All market parameters are the same as in this figure 17. Initial conditions
are: x(0) = 5 and y(0) = 0. The volatility parameter is σ = 2. The trajectory jumps between
the trapping regions corresponding to the points {0, 0}, {−s, 0}, and {s, 0}, and the trapping
regions related to the cycles C−s and Cs.
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